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Abstract
We propose an easy implementable prepare-and-measure protocol for robust quantum key distri-
bution with photon polarization. The protocol is fault tolerant against collective random unitary
channel noise. The protocol does not need any collective quantum measurement or quantum mem-
ory. A security proof and a specific linear optical realization using spontaneous parametric down
conversion are given.
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Introduction. Quantum key distribution (QKD)[1, 2] is one of the most important ap-
plication of the subject of quantum information. In constrast to classical cryptography, the
security of QKD is guaranteed by elementary principles of quantum mechanics, and there-
fore the unconditional security can be achieved. For security, we have to distill out a shorter
final key, since Eavesdropper (Eve) may pretend her disturbance to be the noise from the
physical channel. If the noise is too large, no final key can be obtained. To overcome this,
one needs to design new fault tolerant protocols or new physical realizations for quantum
key distribution. There are two approaches two this problem: one is to find a new proto-
col which raises the threshold of channel noise unconditionally, such as the protocol with
2 way classical communications[3, 4, 5]; the other way is first to study the noise pattern
and then find a way to remove or decrease the noise itself, such as the various method to
cancel the collective errors[6, 7, 8]. So far there are various realizations using either the
phase-coding[2, 18] or the polarization information of single photons[19, 20]. Those proto-
cols using the phase-coding requires collective measurement at Bob’s side. There are also
proposals to remove the collective random unitary noise from the channel[6, 7, 8].
Here we raise a new proposal to reduce the channel errors, or, equivalently, to raise the
noise threshold. Our method does not require Bob to take any collective measurement. Our
method is based on the widely accepted assumptions that the flipping errors of polarization
(mainly) come from the random rotation by the fiber or the molecules in the air, with
the degree of the rotation fluctuating randomly. Also, if several qubits are transmitted
simultaneously and they are spatially close to each other, the random unitaries to each of
them must be identical, i.e., the error of the physical channel is collective.
Main Idea. Consider an arbitrary collective random unitary U which satisfies
U |0〉 = cos θ|0〉+ eiφ sin θ|1〉;
U |1〉 = ei∆(−e−iφ sin θ|0〉+ cos θ|1〉 (1)
Here |0〉, |1〉 represent for horizontal and vertical polarization states respectively. Note that
the parameters ∆, φ and θ fluctuate with time, therefore one has no way to make unitary
compensation to a single qubit. However, the channel unitary error is a type of collective
error to all qubits sent simultaneously, therefore it is possible to send qubits robustly because
the collective errors on different qubits may cancel each other. With such type of collective
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unitary errors, we shall take the QKD in the subspace of two-qubit state of
S = {|01〉, |10〉}. (2)
In particular, we let Alice prepare and send Bob two-qubit states randomly chosen from
|01〉, |10〉, |ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉± |10〉). Although state |ψ−〉 keeps unchanged under the collective
unitary errors[11], the other 3 states do not keep unchanged. However, in our protocol, we
shall let Bob first take a parity check to the two-qubit state to see whether it belongs to
subspace S. If it does, he accepts it, if it does not, he discard it. The key point here is that,
although the 2-qubit states could be distorted by the collective random unitary, most often
the distortion will drive the codes out of subspace S therefore the distorted codes will be
discarded by the protocol itself. The error rates to those accepted codes are normally small,
provided that the channel noise are mainly from the collective unitary and the averaged value
θ is not too large. For example, our protocol gives a good key rate if the averaged value
| sin θ| is 1/2. (The dispersion, φ value can be arbitrarily large.) Explicitly, any collective
rotation cannot exchange states |ψ+〉 and |ψ−〉, it can only drive |ψ+〉 out of the subspace
S. However, any state outside of S will be rejected, as required by our protocol. Therefore
the rate of flipping between |ψ+〉 and ψ−〉 (phase-flip rate) is zero. A collective rotation U
will also take the following effects:
U⊗2|01〉 = U |0〉 ⊗ U |1〉
= cos2 θ|01〉 − sin θ cos θ(e−iφ|00〉+ eiφ|11〉) + sin2 θ|10〉. (3)
U⊗2|10〉 = U |1〉 ⊗ U |0〉
= cos2 θ|10〉 − sin θ cos θ(e−iφ|00〉+ eiφ|11〉) + sin2 θ|01〉. (4)
Since the states outside the subspace S will be discarded, the net flipping between rate
between |01〉 and |10〉 (bit-flip rate) rb =
sin4 θ
cos4 θ+sin4 θ
. Therefore, if the average rotating angle
is small, the flipping rate rb will be also small. (If we directly use BB84 protocol, the bit-flip
rate is sin2 θ, one magnitude order larger than ours.) Moreover, in the ideal case that all flips
come from the random rotation, since the phase-flip rate is zero, one can always distill some
bits of final key provided that rb 6= 1/2. The key rate is 1 + rb log2 rb + (1− rb) log2(1− rb).
Note that if rb > 1/2 one can simply reverse all bit values given by |01〉 and |10〉 and also
distill some bits of final key. In practice, if θ does not change too fast, we can divide the
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data into many blocks, say, each block contains the data with several seconds. We inverse
the bit-values of those blocks with larger than 1/2 error rate after the decoding. Note that
we assume the phase-flip error to be always very small by our protocol.
Boileau et al[8] has proposed a protocol with the collective random unitary error model
recently. Our work differs from ref.[8] in the following aspects: 1). The main idea is dif-
ferent. Ref.[8] uses the fact that state |ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉) is invariant under whatever
rotations therefore the linear combinations of a few |ψ−〉 at different positions will work
robustly. We use a subspace of two qubit state. Our states are not always invariant under
random rotations, however, the randomly rotation can drive the original state out of the
specific subspace and never or rarely switch any two states inside the subspace. After Bob
discards all those transmitted codes outside subspace S, the phase-flip error will be totally
removed and the bit flip error will be significantly decreased. 2). The method is different.
The protocol given by Boileau et al requires 3-qubit or 4-qubit entangled states, which could
be technically difficult by currently existing technology. Our protocol only requires 2-qubit
states which can be produced effectively. 3). The result is different. Since our protocol is
BB84-like[1], we don’t have to worry about the channel loss in practice. Boileau’s protocol
is likely to be undermined by the channel loss, since it is B92-like[9, 10]. In practice, the
lossy rate for their protocol could be very high. Since they use at least 3 qubits to encode
one, the joint survival rate is very low.
Protocol 1 and Security Proof. For clarity, we now give a protocol with collective mea-
surements first and then reduce it to a practically feasible protocol without any collective
measurements.
Protocol 1 1: Preparation of the encoded BB84 states. Alice creates a number of
single qubit states, each of them is randomly chosen from {|0〉, |1〉, |±〉}. She put down each
one’s preparation basis and bit value: state |0〉, |+〉 for bit value 0, the other 2 states are
for 1. She also prepares ancillas which are all in state |0〉. She then encodes each indi-
vidual qubit with an ancilla into a 2-qubit code through the following CNOT operation:
|00〉 −→ |01〉; |10〉 −→ |10〉; |11〉 −→ |11〉; |01〉 −→ |00〉. The second digit in each state is for
the ancilla. Such encoding operation changes (|0〉, |1〉) into (|01〉, |10〉) and |±〉 into |ψ±〉. 2:
State transmission. Alice sends those 2-qubit codes to Bob. 3: Error-rejection and
Decoding. Bob takes the same CNOT operation as used by Alice in encoding. He then
measures the second qubit in Z basis: if it is |1〉, he discards both qubits and notifies Alice; if
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he obtains |0〉, he measures the first qubit in either X basis or Z basis and records the basis
as his “measurement basis” in the QKD protocol. The bit-value of a code is determined by
the measurement outcome of the first qubit after decoding, |0〉, |+〉 for bit value 0, |1〉, |−〉
correspond to 1. 4: Basis announcement. Through public discussion, they discard all
those decoded qubits with different measurement bases in two sides. 5: Error test. They
announce the values of some randomly chosen X bits and the same number of Z bits. If
too many values disagree, they abort the protocol. Otherwise they distill the remained “Z
bits” for the final key. 6: Final key distillation. Alice and Bob distill the final key from
the remained “Z bits” by the classical CSS code[12].
The unconditional security here is equivalent to that of BB84[1, 12] with a lossy noisy
channel: Protocol 1 can be regarded as an encoded BB84 protocol with additional steps
of encoding, error rejection and decoding. If Eve. can attack Protocol 1 successfully with
operation Aˆ during the stage of codes transmission, she can also attack BB84 protocol
successfully with
Aˆ′ = Eˆ −→ Aˆ −→ Rˆ −→ Dˆ (5)
during the qubit transmission and then pass the decoded qubit to Bob, where Eˆ, Rˆ, Dˆ are
encoding, error rejection and quantum decoding, respectively. (The operation of encoding,
error rejection or decoding does not requires any information about the unknown state itself.)
Obviously, BB84 protocol with attack Aˆ′ is identical to Protocol 1 with attack Aˆ. To Alice
and Bob, BB84 protocol with Eve’s attack Aˆ′ is just a BB84 protocol with a lossy channel.
(Eve must discard some codes in the error rejection step.) Therefore Protocol 1 must be
secure, since BB84 protocol is unconditional secure even with a lossy channel.
Protocol 2. Though we have demonstrated the unconditional security of Protocol 1, we do
not directly use Protocol 1 in practice since it requires the local CNOT operation in encoding
and decoding. We now reduce it to another protocol without any collective operations. First,
since there are only 4 candidates in the set of BB84 states, instead of encoding from BB84
states, Alice may directly produce 4 random states of |01〉, |10〉, |ψ+〉, |ψ−〉. Note that except
for Alice herself, no one else can see whether the two-qubit codes in transmission are directly
produced or the encoding result from BB84 states. One may simply produce the states of
those 2-qubit codes by the spontaneous parametric down conversion[13, 14]. Second, in the
decoding and error rejection step, Bob can carry out the task by post-selection. For all those
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codes originally in state |01〉 or |10〉, Bob can simply take local measurements in Z basis
to each qubits and then discard those outcome of |0〉 ⊗ |0〉 or |1〉 ⊗ |1〉 and only accepts
the outcome |0〉 ⊗ |1〉 which is regarded as a bit value 0 and |1〉 ⊗ |0〉 which is regarded as
bit value 1. The net flipping rate between |01〉 and |10〉 is regarded as bit-flip rate. The
non-trivial point is the phase-flip rate, i.e., the net flipping rate between states |ψ±〉. Note
that all these codes only take the role of indicating the phase-flip rate, we don’t have to know
explicitly which one is flipped and which one is not flipped. Instead, we only need to know
the average flipping rate between |ψ±〉. To obtain such information, we actually don’t have
to really carry out the error rejection and decoding steps to each of these codes. What we
need to do is simply to answer what the flipping rate would be if Bob really took the error
rejection step and decoding step to each codes of |ψ±〉. One straight forward way is to let
Bob take a Bell measurement to each code which were in state |ψ±〉 originally.(We shall call
them ψ+ codes or ψ− codes hereafter.) For example, consider ψ− codes, after transmission,
if the distribution over 4 Bell states |ψ+〉, |ψ−〉, |φ+〉, |φ−〉 are pψ−, pψ+ , pφ+ , pφ−, respectively
after the Bell measurements, we conclude that the channel flipping rate of |ψ+〉 −→ |ψ−〉
is pψ−/(pψ+ + pψ−). This rate is equivalent to the flipping rate of |+〉 −→ |−〉 in BB84
protocol. Note that the rate of qφ± have been excluded here since their corresponding states
are outside of the subspace S and should be discarded by our protocol.
Bell measurement is not the unique way to see the distribution over 4 Bell states for a set
of states. We can also simply divide the set into 3 subsets and take collective measurements
ZZ to subset 1, XX to subset 2, and Y Y to subset 3. We can then deduce the distribution
over the 4 Bell states. Here ZZ,XX, Y Y are parity measurements to a two-qubit code in
Z,X, Y basis, respectively. (Y : measurement basis of {|y±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± i|1〉)}.) Note that
here classical statistics works perfectly because all these collective measurements commute
[15, 16]. These collective measurements can be simply replaced by local measurements to
each qubits since once we have done the results of local measurements of Z⊗Z,X⊗X, Y ⊗Y
we know the parity information. (In this paper, Z ⊗ Z represents a local measurement to
each qubit in Z basis; ZZ represents a collective measurement for the parity in Z basis.)
Before going into the reduced protocol, we show the explicit relationship between the
phase-flip rate and the local measurement results. Note that Bob has randomly divided all
the received 2-qubit codes into 3 subsets and he will take local measurement Z ⊗ Z,X ⊗
X, Y ⊗ Y to each of the qubits of each codes in subset 1,2,3, respectively. Consider all ψ−
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codes first. Denote ǫz, ǫx, ǫy for the rate of wrong outcome for ψ
− codes in subset 1,2,3,
respectively, i.e. the rate of codes whose two qubit has the same bit values in basis Z,X, Y ,
respectively. Given values ǫz,x,y we immediately have
pφ+ + pφ− = ǫz (6)
pψ+ + pφ+ = ǫx (7)
pψ+ + pφ− = ǫy. (8)
Our aim is only to see the flipping rate from |ψ−〉 to |ψ+〉, other types of errors are discarded
since they have gone out of the given subspace S. The net flipping rate from |ψ−〉 to |ψ+〉 is
tψ−→ψ+ =
pψ+
pψ− + pψ+
=
ǫx + ǫy − ǫz
2(1− ǫz)
. (9)
In a similar way we can also have the formular for the value of tψ+→ψ−, the flipping rate
from |ψ+〉 to |ψ−〉:
tψ+→ψ− =
ǫ′x + ǫ′y − ǫ′z
2(1− ǫ′z)
. (10)
Here ǫ′x,y,z are rate of wrong outcome in local measurement basis X ⊗ X, Y ⊗ Y, Z ⊗ Z,
respectively, to all codes originally in |ψ+〉. The total phase-flip error is
tp =
tψ−→ψ+ + tψ+→ψ−
2
. (11)
Protocol 1 is now replaced by the following practically feasible protocol without any collective
measurement:
Protocol 2 1: Preparation of the encoded BB84 states. Alice creates a number of 2-
qubit states and each of them are randomly chosen from {|01〉, |10〉, |ψ±〉}. For each 2-qubit
code, she puts down “Z basis” if it is in state |01〉 or |10〉 or “X basis” ({|±〉}) if it is in one
of the states { 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉). For those code states of |01〉 or { 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉), she denotes
a bit value 0 ; for those code states of |10〉 or { 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉), she denotes a bit value 1. 2:
Transmission. Alice sends all the 2-qubit codes to Bob. 3: Measurement. To each code,
Bob measures the two qubits in a basis randomly chosen from {Z ⊗Z,X ⊗X, Y ⊗ Y }. For
example, if he happens to choose basis Z ⊗ Z for a certain code, he measures each qubit of
that code in Z basis. 4: Rejection of wrong results. Alice announces her “preparation
basis” for each codes. Bob announces his measurement basis to each codes. For those codes
originally prepared in |01〉 or |10〉, they discard the results if Bob has used a basis other
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FIG. 1: (Color online) The source of two-qubit state. P: pi/2 rotater. BS: beam splitter, M:
mirror, NC: nonlinear crystal, p: pump light in horizontal polarization, u1: unitary rotator, u2:
phase shifter. u1 takes the value of 0, pi/2, pi/4 to produce state |01〉, |10〉, |ψ+〉, respectively. u2
can be either I or σz.
than Z ⊗ Z. They also discard all codes outside the subspace S. 5: Error test. To all
the survived results, they announce some bit values of codes originally in |ψ+〉 or |ψ−〉.
From the announced results they can calculate the phase-flip rate by formula(11). They can
also estimate the bit-flip rate by annoucing some results of those survived codes which are
originally in |01〉 or |10〉. 6: Final key distillation. Alice and Bob distill the final key
from the remianed “Z bits” by using the classical CSS code[12]. (Since they only use “Z
bits” for final key distillation, Alice can choose “Z basis” more frequently than “X basis”
in Step 1.)
Physical Realization of Protocol 2. There are two parts in the realization. One is the source
for the required 4 different 2-qubit states at Alice’s side. The other is the measurement
device at Bob’s side. Both of them can be realized with simple linear optical devices.
The requested source states can be generated by SPDC process[13, 14] as shown in figure
1. The measurement with random basis at Bob’s side can be done by a polarizing beam
splitter(PBS) and a rotator driven electrically, as shown in figure 2.
Another protocol for robust QKD with swinging objects. In some cases, especially in free
space, the dispersion can be small while the random rotation angle θ can be large. We
consider the extreme case that φ in unitary U is 0, or otherwise can be compensated to almost
0, but θ is random and can be arbitrarily large. The swinging angle of an airplane can be very
large in certain case. We can exactly use the collective unitary model, with all elements in U
being real if there is no dispersion. Then we have a better method. It is well known that both
states |φ+〉 and |ψ−〉 are invariant under whatever real rotation. Any linear superposed state
of these two are also invariant. Therefore we use the following for states {|0¯〉 = |φ+〉, |1¯〉 =
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Measurement device at Bob’s side. The rotator R offers a random rotation
to both qubits in the same code. Each time, rotation is randomly chosen from unity, (|0〉, |1〉) −→
(|+〉, |−〉), (|0〉, |1〉) −→ (|y+〉, |y−〉). The event of two clicks on one detector (D1 or D2) show that
the 2 qubits of the code have the same bit value, two clicks on different detectors show that the 2
qubits have different bit values.
|ψ−〉; |+′〉 = 1√
2
(|0¯〉+ |1¯〉) = 1√
2
(|0〉|+〉 − |1〉|−〉); |−′〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|−〉+ |1〉|+〉)}. Bob need not
take any collective measurement to determine the bit value. If he chooses “Z” basis, he
measure each of the two qubits in Z basis, 00 or 11 for bit value 0 while 01 or 10 for bit
value 1. If he chooses “X” basis, he measures the first qubit in Z basis and the second in
X basis, |0〉|+〉 or |1〉|−〉 for bit value 0 and |0〉|−〉 or |1〉|+〉 for bit value 1. There is no
error-rejection step here because it is expected to be no error after decoding, given the real
rorarion channel. Even for the QKD with fixed object there is still a little bit advantage:
they do not need take any bases allignment with each other. Each of them only need to
make sure their local measurement bases are BB84-like, i.e., the inner product of two bases
are 1√
2
.
Concluding remark. We have given a robust QKD protocol in polarization space given that
the collective random unitaries are dominant channels errors. Our protocol can obviously be
extended to the 6-state-like protocol[17] if we add one more candidate state of 1√
2
(|0〉±i|1〉)in
the source.
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Note Added: After the work was completed, a different novel protocol[21] for robust QKD
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has drawn our attention.
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